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GENERATING EXTRA WIND IN THE SAILS OF THE EU
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT BOAT
CorinneBergen*

INTRODUCTION
With 90% of its antitrust law enforcement generated by private rights
of action, the United States provides a great opportunity for aggrieved
consumers to right the wrongs that have been done to them, while concurrently,
Consumers assist the
maximizing its avenues of antitrust enforcement.'
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with the
enforcement of the U.S. antitrust law by asserting the right granted to them
under the Clayton Act2 to bring private actions. Unlike the U.S. system for
antitrust enforcement, the European Union ("EU") does not expressly provide
its citizens with a private right of action with which to secure compensation for
violations. Currently however, the EU is working on creating an environment
where the private right of action can thrive and succeed in compensating
consumers, as well as, increasing the enforcement of its antitrust law.4
* J.D. candidate, 2007, Hofstra University School of Law. First and foremost I wish to recognize
the hard work and effort of the Journal of International Business & Law staff, especially my Notes
& Comments Editor, Mr. Andrew Extract and Editor-In-Chief, Ms. Sally Sancimino. I would like
to thank Professor Christine Verity for her thoughtful guidance as my faculty advisor and offer my
sincerest gratitude to fellow classmate Catherine Culhane for her continued encouragement and
friendship. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to dedicate this note to my parents, Valerie and
Thomas Bergen, whose unconditional love and never-ending support has led me to where I am
today and wherever I may find myself in the future! Thanks again to all!
1 Katherine Holmes, Public Enforcement or Private Enforcement? Enforcement of Competition
Law in the EC and UK, E.C.L.R., 25(1), 25-36 (2004).
2 15 U.S.C. § 12-27 (2000).
3 Clifford A. Jones, Exporting Antitrust Courtrooms to the World: Private Enforcement in a Global
Market, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 409, 411 (2004) [herein after Jones] (countering the
argument that the lack of treble damages is the cause of the deficiency in private antitrust
enforcement actions in foreign nations by arguing that prejudgment interest sufficiently
compensates consumers outside the US); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (containing the statutory grant of a
private right of action).
" Commission Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules: (December 19,
2005), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions-for-damages/gp-en.pdf (last visited
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With the growth of transnational business dealings comes the
responsibility of the EU to consider adopting a system for private enforcement
that will not only work productively throughout Europe, as well as, with the
U.S. system, but also work to promote competition while maintaining consumer
protection. There are key features of the U.S. private enforcement system that
work collectively to provide an incentive for individuals to take on the roles of
"private attorneys general ' 5 and the adoption of these key features, or a
variation thereof, is necessary to a successful application of the private right of
action in the EU.6
The recent actions taken by the EU with regard to private enforcement
lay the first bricks on a path to effective and protective competition law
enforcement in the EU, however, in order for the EU to establish a valuable
private right of action it is necessary to look to the US system and examine how
its different aspects work to provide a private right of action. This Note studies
the current state of antitrust regulation in the U.S. and EU and examines the
possible structures for a successful private right of action in the EU.
Part I contains a discussion of the state of antitrust law as it exists in
the U.S. Part II discusses the current state of antitrust or competition law in the
EU and the recent actions taken by the EU that will open the doors to the
inception of a successful private right of action for its citizens. Part III provides
an overview of how the encouragement in the U.S. to pursue a private right of
action, not only stems from the ability of the plaintiff to recover treble damages,
as well as attorneys' fees, but also from broad discovery which makes it feasible
for plaintiffs to obtain a significant amount of evidence, thereby increasing their
chances of proving a violation of the law.7 Also discussed in this section is how
the availability of contingency fee arrangements and class actions in the US
system allow those with minor claims to come together and bring suit against8
those violators who may have otherwise gone unpunished for their offences.
While incorporating a version of the aspects of the U.S. antitrust law into the
EU system may encourage individuals to assert their private right of action,
Jan. 14, 2006) ("Green papers are discussion papers published by the [European] Commission on a
specific policy area. Primarily they are documents addressed to interested parties - organizations
and individuals - who are invited to participate in a process of consultation and debate. In some
cases they provide an impetus for subsequent legislation").
5 Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public Interests in Private
InternationalAntitrustLitigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219, 224 (2001) ("examin[ing] the growing
inconsistencies in judicial evaluation of the public interest at stake in regulatory disputes").
6 Donncadh Woods, PrivateEnforcement ofAntitrust Rules - Modernizationof the EU Rules ad the
RoadAhead, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 431, 433 (2004) [hereinafter Woods].
7 Janet L. McDavid & Howard Weber, E. U. PrivateActions, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 25, 2005, available
at http://www.nli.com (last visited Sept. 14, 2005).
8 id.
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there are other aspects of the U.S. construct, such as standing and the indirect
purchaser exclusion, that are relevant to the issue of private antitrust litigation 9.
And finally, part IV points to the EU's recently published Green Paper on
"Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules,"'10 and addresses the
issues raised by the structural suggestions for EU competition law contained
therein.
UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW

A. U.S. Statutory Antitrust Law and Its Enforcers
In the U.S., consumer protection against "business practices that
unreasonably deprive customers of the benefits of competition, resulting in
higher prices for inferior products and services,"" is set forth in two basic
antitrust laws, the Sherman Act 12 and the Clayton Act.' 3 In addition to these
two laws, the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) is also utilized to prevent
4
the deprivation of the benefits of competition for the benefit of the consumer.'
i. The Sherman Act of 1890
In 1890, Congress utilized the authority granted to it under the U.S.
Constitution, to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes,"' 15 to ratify the Sherman Act.' 6 The
9 Id.
'0 See Commission Green Paper, supra note 4.
1 U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530: Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer
(1996), available at http://www.pueblo.gsa.gov/cictext/misc/antitrust/antitrus.htm (last visited
April 16, 2006).
12 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (2000).
1315 U.S.C. § 12-27 (2000).
14 See CRS Report for Congress, 95-116: General Overview of United States Antitrust Law (1995)
[hereinafter CRS Report] (Stating that these laws do not constitute the entirely of antitrust law in the
United States, but rather they are those which are most often utilized. "There are also some statutes
directed to specific industries or types of transactions which indicate the likely antitrust
consequences for economic conduct in those areas," such as the Export Trading Company Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 4001-21, and the Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3591-03.),
available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/risk/rsk-63.cfm (last visited April 16, 2006).
15 U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8, cl.
3.
16 Jaafar A. Riazi, Finding Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Antitrust Claims of Extraterritorial
Origin: Whether the Seventh Circuit'sApproach Properly BalancesPolices of InternationalComity
and Deterrence,54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1277, 1280 (2005).
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Sherman Act consists of seven sections laying out the foundations of illegality
with regard to business practices. 17 Of these seven sections, Sections 1 and 2
are of the greatest importance. Section 1 declares felonious, "every contract,
combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations."' 8 Under
Section 2 felony status is granted for "every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations."' 19 Violations
under the Sherman Act are
20
punishable civilly, as well as, criminally.
The mission of the Antitrust Division of the United States Department
of Justice is to "promote and protect the competitive process - and the
American economy - through the enforcement of the antitrust laws.,,2 1 The
DOJ is the only source of antitrust enforcement that is able to bring both civil
and criminal enforcement actions pertaining to the antitrust laws.22 The DOJ
may "prosecute serious and willful violations of the antitrust laws by filing
criminal suits that can lead to large fines and jail sentences. 23 Where criminal
enforcement actions are not suitable, the DOJ will bring civil actions "seeking
court orders forbidding future violation of the law and requiring steps to remedy
the anti-competitive effects of past violations. 24 Punishment for violations can
reach up to $100,000,000 for corporations, $1,000,000 for any person, or
imprisonment up to 10 years, or a combination of fines and imprisonment.25
ii. The Clayton Act of 1914
The Clayton Act, enacted in 1914, is comprised of Sections 12 to 27 of
Title 15, which seek to fill in the gaps left open by the Sherman Act.26 These

7 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (2000).
Is 15 U.S.C. § 1(2000).
'9 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).

2o 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000).
21U.S. Department of Justice, Overview

Antitrust Division, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/overview.html (last visited March 21, 2006) [hereinafter DOJ:Overviewl.
22 U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530: Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer,
availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/divstats/2 11491.htm (last visited March 21, 2006).
23 See DOJ: Overview, supra note 21.
24 id.
25

Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enforcement Act 2004 (raising the statutory maximum fines from

$10,000,000 to $100,000,000 for corporations, and from $350,000 to $1,000,000 for individuals,
and the maximum prison sentence from three years to ten years).
26 15 U.S.C. § 12-27 (2000).
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sections punish such illegal practices as price-fixing27, bid rigging, and tying
arrangements. 28 The importance of this act cannot be underestimated because,
not only does it add to the reach of the Sherman Act by establishing the right to
prevent activity "in its incipiency which may tend to restrain trade, 29 but it also
grants the right of "any person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws [to] sue therefore in any
district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides
or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy."' 30 In
addition to providing the much needed private right of action the Clayton Act
allows those seeking a private right of action to collect treble damages 31, court
costs and attorney's fees.32
iii. The Federal Trade Commission Act
The Federal Trade Commission Act, along with the Clayton Act, was
enacted in 1914, supplements the Sherman and Clayton Acts and provides for
the Federal Trade Commission. The FTC is "empowered and directed to
prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations... from using unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce,33 and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
2 See 15 U.S.C.

§

13 (2000) (Stating that it is illegal for any person to "discriminate in price

between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality... where the effects of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them").
28 Tying arrangements exist where entities conspire to sell their product in connection with another
product so that if the consumer wants "X" he must also purchase "Y".
29 See Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, supra note 14. The Sherman act
provides protection against concerted activity which actually restrains trade, while the Clayton Act
allows for protection against concerted activity which may tend to restrain trade, but which has not
yet done so. An example of the use of these laws would be the prevention of a merger between two
entities which if permitted to go forth would restrain trade.
'0 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
31 Treble damages consist of three times the actual damages sustained.
32 See Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, supra note 14. (In 1982 the provision
for damages was amended to restrict foreign states from recovering more than actual damages, court
costs, and reasonable attorney's fees. (15 U.S.C. § 15(b)). In addition, until 1990 the United States
was unable to collect treble damages in the event that it sustained monetary injury, but fortunately
this limitation was removed by Congress after "hearing testimony to the effect that the damage
limitation made the federal government the 'antitrust victim of choice').
33See Federal Trade Commission Act [hereinafter FTCA], 15 U.S. C. § 44. (Defining "commerce"
as "commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United
States or District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such
Territory and any State or Territory or foreign nation").
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in or affecting commerce".34 The Bureau of Competition, the antitrust arm of
the FTC, carries out its mission to "allow for unfettered competition in the
marketplace" by investigating alleged antitrust violations and alerting
the FTC
35
to when it is necessary to take formal action against such violators.
As both the DOJ and the FTC are given the responsibility of enforcing
the antitrust laws, it is necessary for these two entities to work in concert so that
they may aid one another in the continued protection of the competitive process
of the American economy, while preventing a duplication of effort on their
parts.36 These entities engage in frequent consultation with one another by
following a "clearance procedure" as each case arises, so that it may be
determined "which agency would be the more appropriate one to handle the
matter., 37 While the DOJ and the FTC play essential roles in the enforcement
of the U.S. antitrust law, it is the private enforcement granted under the Clayton
Act which plays a pivotal role consisting of about 90% of the total U.S. antitrust
enforcement.3
B. The United States Private Right of Action
When private individuals assert the right granted to them under the
Clayton Act they may do so in one of two forms. 3 9 The first is the pure statutory
form, and the second is the contract form.4 ° In the pure statutory form, the
private litigant assumes the role of "private attorney general" by seeking
compensation for a wrong that may have been done to him, while at the same
time acting in a capacity that defends the public interest. 41 Under this form, the
litigant alleges that he or she has suffered damages, generally, not as a result of
some contractual relationship between the parties, but rather, as a result of
another's violation(s) of the U.S. antitrust law.42

'4

FTCA, 15 U.S.C. § 45.

35 Federal Trade Commission: Bureau of Competition. http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/antitrust.htm (last

visited September 14, 2005).
36 id.

37 Department of Justice, Division Manual, Antitrust Division with Other Agencies and with the

Public. http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanual/ch7.htm (last visited October 8, 2005).
38 See Holmes, supra note 1.
39 See Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 224 ("examin[ing] the growing inconsistencies in judicial
evaluation of the public interest at stake in regulatory disputes").
4

Id.

41 Id.

at 222.

Id. at 224. (In such instances a contracting party may claim that the forum selection clause should
be vacated because violations of United States antitrust laws are present, so that the private litigant
may have the advantage of litigating in a more favorable forum).
42
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Unlike the pure statutory form, under the contract form the individual's
claims are most often raised in situations where some type of contractual
relationship 43 exists between the two parties. A plaintiff may seek the
protection of the U.S. antitrust law in an offensive way, for example, in a
situation where there is "a licensee who believes that a breach of contract by its
licensor involves violations of U.S. antitrust law." 44 However, more commonly,
the U.S. antitrust law is utilized under the contract form in a defensive way,
where a defendant seeks to avoid contract terms which may include forum
selection clauses and the like.45 Differing from cases brought in the pure
statutory form, cases of the contractual nature "reveal a focus on private-law
46
values rather than on the strength or character of the public interest asserted.
Of the two forms, it is the pure statutory form in which enforcement of
the antitrust law or compensation for the violation of antitrust law is the main
objective, while under the contractual form the claimant is most likely utilizing
the antitrust law as leverage to further their own private interests. These actions
may be brought by individuals, but they are most often brought by a class
consisting of consumers who have been aggrieved48by another's violation of the
47
law or by states acting on behalf of their citizens.

43 Id. at 237. (These contractual relationships are generally international relationships as the conflict

arises as a result of the enforcement of forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses in international
agreements).
SId.

at 226.

45 Id.

Id. at 236. (As there is a "judicial unwillingness to insist on the application of domestic
regulatory law in the face of private contractual arrangements... contract cases have marginalized
the private attorney general by sharply restricting the circumstances in which private attorneys
general can assert U.S. laws abroad").
41 See 15 U.S.C. 15(c) (2000) (granting "any attorney general of a State" the right to "bring a civil
action in the name of such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in such
State.. .for injury sustained by such natural persons to their property by reason of any violation" of
the Sherman Act).
48 See Charles W. Smitherman III, The Future of Global Competition Governance; Lessons from
the Transatlantic,19 Am. U. Int'l Rev. 769, 806 (2004) (discussing long-term convergence through
continued strong extraterritoriality and cooperation by the United States and the European
Community as a model for future competition law).
4
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PRESENT STATE OF EU ANTITRUST LAW

A. EU Antitrust Law and Its Enforcers
Presently in the EU, antitrust enforcement generally lies in the public
sector, as there is an absence of a guaranteed right to its citizens to bring private
actions against violators of its antitrust law. The EU's antitrust law, or
competition law as termed from the European perspective, is set forth in
Articles 81
and 82 of the Treaty Establishing a European Community ("EEC
49
Treaty").
Article 81 (1) of the treaty prohibits "all agreements between
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices
which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object
or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market., 50 More or less analogous to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, it
can be said that a violation of Article 81 calls for "at least two companies..' 51
.involved in restraining trade, as opposed to unilateral action by one business.
In addition to listing particular "undertakings," which are prohibited, such as
price-fixing and bid-rigging, Article 81 (3) declares Article 81 (1) to be
inapplicable if any such undertaking "contributes to improving the production
or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic
progress, while
52
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit".
Congruent to Section 2 of the U.S. Sherman Act, which prohibits
monopolization or attempted monopolization,53 Article 82 prohibits "any abuse
by one or more undertakings of a dominant position with the common market or

'9 EC Treaty art. 81-82.

50EC Treaty art. 81 (1).
51Larry Bumgardner, JD, Antitrust Law in the European Union: The Law is Changing- But to
What Effect?, 8 GRAZIADIO BUS. REP. (2005), availableat
http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/053/euantitrust.htm (last visited, April 16, 2006).
52 EC Treaty art. 81 (3); 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (2000) (While the Sherman Act does not specifically
provide for an exception such as is present in Art 81(3) of the EU antitrust law, it does state that
when presiding over antitrust claims the court has discretion when it comes to punishment for such
violations. As this is the case, it may be possible that a court would be less likely to harshly punish
those violators whose acts have contributed to the production of goods or promote technology,
while creating a benefit for the consumer).
53See Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, supra note 14.
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in a substantial part of it. . .insofar as it may affect trade between Member
States. 54 Though similar in context, it has been argued that the U.S. antitrust
scheme is geared more toward consumer protection, while the EU scheme is
primarily focused on protecting competition.55
Unlike the U.S. antitrust laws which are enforced by public as well as
private entities, Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, entrusts the duty of enforcing the
competition laws to the European Commission ("the Commission"), stating that
it shall "ensure the application of the principles laid down in Articles 81 and
82. ''s6 Also, under Article 82, the Commission is ordered to work "on its own
initiative, and in cooperation with the competent authorities in the Member
States" when investigating possible violations of the competition law. 57 In the
event that such a violation is present, the Commission has the duty of proposing
appropriate measures to bring it to an end or alternatively to record such
violations and authorize the Member States to remedy the situation according to
its orders. 58 In assigning punishment, the Commission and respective Member
States subject companies to heavy monetary fines, "which may be as large as 10
percent of the companies' worldwide annual revenue," however the EU does
not issue criminal penalties for competition law violations. 59
i. Member States
As the states in the U.S. each have their own set of local antitrust laws,
the Member States in the EU each have their own diverse governments and
versions of competition law. Some Member States provide for the private
enforcement of their competition laws, 60 however the lack of a set rule

governing private enforcement under the EU competition law leaves plaintiffs
"with little or no legal guidance in many jurisdictions." 6' As a result of the
variation that exists from one Member State to the next in terms of substantive
as well as procedural aspects of their competition law, there is the "possibility
of inconsistent verdicts and forum shopping. ' 62

5

EC Treaty art. 82.

55 See Bumgardner, supranote
56 EC Treaty art. 85.

51.

57EC Treaty art. 82.
58EC Treaty art. 85.
59See Bumgardner, supranote 51..
60See McDavid, supra note 7 (stating that only 12 out of the 25 member states appear to expressly
provide for a private right of action to seek damages resulting from violations of their competition
laws).
61 Id.
62 id.
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B. Paving the Way for a Private Right of Action
The private right of action is neither explicitly forbidden by EU
competition law, nor specifically granted.63 As a result, it was unclear whether
such a right existed until the 1999 European Court of Justice ("ECJ")64 decision
of Courage v. Crehan.65 In that case the ECJ held that the usefulness of the
competition law and "the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in Article
81(1)66 would be put at risk if it were not open to an individual to claim
' 67
damages for loss caused by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition. ,
As a result of this notion and the explicit grant of power over enforcement of
the competition law laying solely in the hands of the Commission under the
EEC Treaty, the EJC went on to conclude that "actions for damages before the
national courts can make a significant 68contribution to the maintenance of
effective competition in the Community.
i. The Birth of National Enforcement of Community
Competition Law
Following the ECJ decision in Courage v Crehan, the EU adopted
Regulation 1/2003 (the "Regulation"), in December of 2002, which established
the foundation for a new and more productive enforcement of Articles 81 and
82.69 Taking effect in May 2004 an important part of the Regulation called for
bringing together national competition authorities with the Commission to form
a network termed the European Competition Network ("ECN"). 70 According to
63John H. Beisner and Charles E. Borden, Expanding Private Causes of Action: Lessons From the
U.S. Litigation Experience, 9-10, available at
http://www.omm.com/webdata/content/newsevents/beisnerpdf2.pdf (last visited, April 16, 2006).
64 EC Treaty art. 83.
65Courage v. Crehan, C-453/99, [2001] ECR 1-6297, availableat http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgibin/forn.pl?Iang=en&Submit=Rechercher&alldocs=alldocs&docj=docj&dcop=dcop&docor-doc
or&docjo=docjo&numaff=C453/99&datefs=&datefc=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax= 00 (last visited, April 16,
2006).
66 EC Treaty art. 81.
67 Id.
68 Id.

69 See Woods, supra note 6 (expanding the author's presentation'given at the Institute for Consumer
Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago examining the issues raised with regard to
incorporating a private right of action into EU competition law), available at,
http://www.luc.edu/law/academics/special/center/antitrust/symposium/woods.pdf (last visited April
16, 2006).
70 Id.
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the Regulation the new system of enforcement will ensure that EU competition
law provides a base standard for the evaluation of possible violations across the
entire EU "thereby establishing a level playing field for companies active in the
international market. 71
The most critical part of the Regulation that may facilitate the opening
of the door to private rights of action in the EU is that which allows national
courts to "fully adjudicate" antitrust matters.72 Prior to this Regulation the
Commission's notification and exemption system 73 was an obstacle to private
enforcement in Member States. Under this system the Commission would
receive a notification of a possible antitrust law violation and then analyze the
suspect action to determine whether it should be exempt from penalty under
Article 81 (3).74 While the Commission was in the process of making a
determination on the issue any ongoing private action on that matter would be
forced to come to a halt, as the Commission would now be the sole law
enforcer.75 However, now that the Regulation has eliminated the Commission's
monopoly on the applicability of Article 81(3)76 national judges will be able to
take a greater role in the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 and there will be
less interruption of ongoing private rights of action taking place in the national
courts.

77

As the Commission does not have the power to award damages to
those who have been injured by a violation of the competition law, the ability of
national courts to apply competition law along with their own national law
creates a number of advantages for private parties seeking action.78 Not only
may private parties assert EU competition law claims in the same action as
national law claims, but these parties will now have the benefit of a faster
litigation process now that there is more than one entity involved in the
71 id.
72 Id.

at 433 (stating that before this Regulation courts in member states were inhibited in their

action because the law called for notification to the Commission of possibly violations, who would
then assume the responsibility of determining whether there was in fact a violation).
73 The notification and exemption system is the process by which the Commission investigates and
determines whether or not an agreement that has been notified to the Commission meets the criteria
for exemption under Article 81(3).
74 EC Treaty art. 81 (3).
75 See Woods, supra note 6, at 433.
76 EC Treaty art 81(3) (Setting forth the situations in which the Commission has the sole right to
find section 81 (1) to be deemed inapplicable).
77 See Woods, supra note 6, at 433.
78 Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in applying Articles 81 and
82 of the EEC Treaty, available at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga.doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numd
oc=31993Y0213(01) (last visited April 16, 2006).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

11

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 8

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

enforcement of the law.79 In addition, national courts have the ability, in those
Member States that permit it, to award legal costs to successful parties.8 0 While
the Commission is not granted the power to award such legal costs, 8the
private
1
parties in certain member states will now be able to reap this benefit.
ii. Member States Applying Community Competition Law in
Their National Courts
When presiding over actions for damages 82 the application of Articles
81 and 82 by the national courts is necessary to determine the illegality of the
conduct giving rise to such actions.8 3 When the national judges engage in such
community law application they must "take account of the Commission's
powers in order to avoid decisions which could conflict with those taken or
envisioned by the Commission."8 4 Though the national courts are not bound by
the rulings of the Court of Justice 85 in the same sense that U.S. courts are bound
by the precedent of higher courts, the "Court of Justice has established a
number of principles which make it possible for such contradictory decision to
be avoided," and the Commission encourages national courts to follow these
principles.86
The first step that a national court must take in determining the
illegality of the "agreement, decision or concerted practice" 87 is to look to
whether it is an action covered by the reach of Articles 81 and/or 82.88 Making
such a determination may prove to be simple if such action has previously been
the "subject of a decision, opinion or other official statement issued by an
administrative authority and in particular by the Commission." 89 Again, though
the national courts would not be bound by such entities' determinations, their
79 Id.

so Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. ("The national courts may have to reach a decision on the application of Articles 81 and 82 in
several procedural situations. In the case of civil law proceedings, two types of action are
particularly frequent: actions relating to contracts and actions for damages. In the former, the
defendant usually relies on Article 81(2) to dispute the contractual obligations invoked by the
plaintiff').
83

id.

84

id.

85 Id.

86 Case 48/72, Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin-Janssen, [1973] ECR 77; Case 127/73, BRT v.

Sabam, [1974] ECR 51; Case C-234/89, Delimitis v. Henninger Brau, [1991] ECR 1-935.
See Notice, supra note 78.

87
88

Id.

9

Id.
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holdings or statements can provide useful information to the national courts
which can aide them in making their determinations.9" In the event the matter
before the national court is one which the Commission has not ruled on, the
national court can still be "guided in interpreting the Community law in
question, by the case-law of the Court of Justice and the existing decisions of
the Commission."91
In order to further aide the national courts in their determinations of
community antitrust law, the Commission has created several notices 92 in which
they specify "categories of agreements that are not caught by the ban laid down
in Article 81. 93 Through the help of these aides the national courts should be
able to make an informed and accurate finding of whether the actions of an
alleged violator are in fact illegal under the community law.94 Should it be the
case that the Commission is in the process of investigating or making a
judgment in a case relating to the same action being questioned in the national
court, then the court may, "if they consider it necessary for reasons of legal
certainty,95 stay the proceedings while awaiting the outcome of the Commission's
action."
iii. National Courts Determining Exemptions Under Article
81(3)
As was stated earlier, Article 81(3) provides the Commission with the
power to make exemptions for those engaging in activities that otherwise would
be illegal under competition law, in a situation where such practice "contributes
to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical
or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting

90 Id. ("It should be noted in this respect that not all procedures before the Commission lead to an
official decision, but that cases can also be closed by comfort letters. Whilst it is true that the Court
of Justice has ruled that this type of letter does not bind national courts, it has nevertheless stated
that the opinion expressed by the Commission constitutes a factor which the national courts may
take into account in examining whether the agreements or conduct in question are in accordance
with the provisions of Article [81] (12)").
91 Id.

See Notice on Exclusive Dealing Contracts with Commercial Agent (OJ no 139, 24. 12. 1962, p.
2921/.62; and Notice on Agreements, Decision and Concerted Practices In the Field of Cooperation
Between enterprises (OJ No C 75, 29. 7. 1968, p. 3, as corrected in OJ No C 84, 28. 8. 1968, p. 14).
9' See Notice, supra note 78.
92

94 id.

93 Id. (Stating that if it is the case that the national courts have remaining doubts about how to
interpret/apply the community law in a certain instance, "they may stay proceedings in order to
bring the matter before the Court of Justice.").
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benefit '96 If it is the case that the Commission has ruled a certain action exempt
under the power granted to it in Article 81(3) then the national courts are
obligated to honor this determination. 97 "Agreements, decisions and concerted
practices which fall within the scope of application of a block exemption
regulation are automatically exempted from the prohibition laid down in Article
81(1) without the need for a Commission decision or comfort letter," and as
such national courts must honor this as well. 98
If an agreement comes before a national court, which does not
constitute a block exemption and which has not been deemed exempt by the
Commission under Article 81(3), the Commission calls for the national courts
to adhere the following procedure: First, the national court must determine
whether the procedural requirement needed for an exemption has been complied
with. 99 In the event that the requirement was not fulfilled, then an exemption is
not applicable and the national court is permitted to decide the issue in question
pursuant to Article 81(2).100 If the requirement has been complied with, then
the national court must "assess the likelihood of an exemption being granted in
the case in question in light of the relevant criteria developed by the case law..
.and by previous regulations and decisions of the Commission."' 01 If it is the
case that the national court has determined that the questioned action cannot be
granted exemption status, then the court must then work to resolve the conflict
in compliance with Article 81(1) and (2).102 However, if the national court
determines that exemption status is achievable, then it has the duty to suspend
the case until the
Commission has been able to make their own determination
10 3
on the matter.
The Commission recognizes that the principles it has given the
national courts are difficult to implement and at times may be lacking in
sufficient guidance to enable the courts to work though the process
96

EC Treaty art. 81 (3).

97 See Notice, supra note 78. (If the Commissions has not made an official ruling on the

applicability of Article 81(3), but has issued comfort letters in which it states that Article 81(3) shall
apply, the "Commission considers that national courts may take account of these letters as factual
elements" and follow them as well).
98See Notice supra note 78.
99Id. (This procedural requirement calls for proper notification of the agreement or concerted
practice to the Commission).
10oId.

10' Id. (Case law for this purpose is referring to the decisions or guidelines set forth by the Court of
Justice and the Court of First Instance).
102 id.
103Id. (During the time in which the case is suspended in the national court, that court is permitted,
so long as in compliance with the law of its nation, to implement any temporary measures it deems
warranted).
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straightforwardly and apply the appropriate law without a hitch.' 4 As a result
of this conflict, the national courts are permitted to bring cases which may cause
them difficulty, before the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, or they may
request the Commission's assistance. 10 5 The EEC Treaty calls for the "constant
06
and sincere cooperation between the Community and the Member States."'
Moreover, with the Courage v. Crehan decision and the implementation of
Regulation 1/2003, EU antitrust enforcement has increased from merely the
Commission alone, to the Commission and the Member States bonded together
as a unified force ensuring the protection of competition in the common
market.'0 7
However, even with this unified public force the amount of antitrust
infringement protection available is still not being fully realized because of the
lack of a strong private sector acting as a deterrent to potential antitrust
violators. 10 8 In order to establish an effective private right of action0 in
the EU it
9
is necessary to look to the antitrust system of the U.S. for guidance.'

104Id. (Difficulties may arise in instances where the "...practical application of Art 81 (1) and
Article 82 gives rise to legal or economic difficulties, where the Commission has initiated a
procedure in the same case or where the agreement, decision or concerted practice concerned may
become the subject of an individual exemption.").
105Id. (When a national court asks the Commission for assistance this assistance may come in the
form of: "information of a procedural nature to enable them to discover whether a certain case is
pending before the Commission, whether a case has been the subject of notification, whether the
Commission has officially initiated a procedure or whether it has already taken a position through
an official decision or through a comfort letter sent by its services," clarification on points of law
and the Commission's "customary practice in relation to the Community law at issue," information
regarding the likelihood that the Commission would grant an exemption in the case at hand, and
finally, information "regarding factual data: statistics, market studies and economic analyses.").
106 Id.
107 Id.

108Julian Joshua, Competition Law: Antitrust law and policy in a globalmarket. Competition Law
Insight (Oct. 12, 2004) availableat
http://www.howrey.com/docs/JulianJoshuascompetitionlawenforcement.pdf (last visited Feb. 24,
2006). (Stating that former Commissioner Mario Monti viewed private rights of action as valuable
claiming that 'the threat of such litigation can have a strong deterrent effect and result in a high
level of compliance with the competition rules'.").
'09 See McDavid, supra note 7.
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FEATURES OF UNITED STATES PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
RELEVANT TO SUCCESSFUL EUROPEAN UNION
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT

A. Class Actions
The attractiveness of the class action suit in the United States is that it
enables one or more individuals with minimal, yet nonetheless important,1
claims to bond together and litigate their claims as a strong unified force."
Creating a greater likelihood that wronged consumers will assert their claims,
the availability of the class action suit also acts as a powerful deterrent against
violations of antitrust law."' Unlike antitrust violators in the U.S., those in the
EU are comforted by the idea that a consumer with a minute monetary claim
will not go through the ordeals of litigation to seek such insignificant redress
because of the lack of such a legal tool like that of the class action.
Those who are critical of the class action suit argue that it tends to shift
the focus from client to lawyer, from damages to attorneys' fees and from
litigation to settlement. This notion stems from the fact that often "the
plaintiffs lawyers receive high fees, while the class action members are
awarded coupons of limited value."' 12 There are additional negative aspects of
class action settlements, such as the pressure upon defendants into settling for
large damage awards in situations where a court may have awarded much less
or found a lack of liability altogether. This comes about because of the threat of
having to endure long litigation3 processes which could potentially cost them
astonishing sums in legal fees."
European unwillingness to provide for collective litigation has eased
with the enactment of the 1998 European Directive on Injunctions for the
Protection of Consumers' Interests (the "Directive")."H4 This Directive required

110See Beisner, supra note 63 ("In other words, the critical feature of the American class action is
that it permits the aggregation and simultaneous determination of numerous claims... some certified
classes have contained millions or tens of millions of class members").
1 See Jones, supra note 3 (stating that though class actions amount to approximately 20 percent of
all private actions in the United States, they have a deterrent effect because of the potential size of
the damage awards).
112 See Woods, supra note 6, at 436.
113

Id.

Directive 98/27/EC on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers' Interests (May 19, 1998),
available at http://europa
.eu.int/comm./consumers/policy/developments/acce.just/acce-justO9_en.pdf (last visited Sept. 19,
11

2005).
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all Member States to implement laws for collective litigation by the year 2000,
however the collective actions called for were not akin to class actions in the
Member States are now obligated to allow some consumer
U.S.11 5
organizations or independent public entities" 6 to bring actions on behalf of a
group of wronged individuals.' 1 7 In addition, the collective actions called for
under the Directive generally demand no more than injunctive or declaratory
relief and in the event that damages are sought, they usually accrue to the
consumer organization and not the individual members of the group."i8 Though
this collective tool exists in the EU, the inability of private individuals to come
together and bring a private class action, under which they are personally
reimbursed for a wrong done to them, hinders the incentive for consumers to
engage in collective actions and, therefore, hinders the potential for a strong
deterrent effect like that of U.S. class actions.
B. Contingency Fee Arrangements/Fee Shifting
When an individual asserts a cause of action there are great transaction
costs, such as money, time and energy. 119 For many, a great obstacle to
bringing a cause of action is the lack of capital necessary to fund such
endeavors. 20 In a contingency-fee system, like that of the U.S., this obstacle is
surmounted with ease; a perspective litigant's monetary worries are alleviated
because law firms assume the costs with hopes of sharing 121 in a potentially
large damage award. 122 Therefore, U.S. plaintiffs risk relatively little when
deciding to pursue a cause of action; either the litigant wins and is awarded
damages minus one third 12 3 for his/her lawyers' fees, or the litigant is
unsuccessful and incurs no monetary cost for his/her representation. Although
it is infrequent that litigants in the U.S. are also awarded their attorneys fees,
under the Clayton Act the U.S. grants a private litigant who asserts an antitrust
claim the right to recover three times the amount of damages he has sustained,
See Beisner, supranote 63, at 5.
Id. (stating that public bodies in this sense means some sort of administrative agency).
117 See Jones, supra note 3, at 428.
118 See Beisner, supra note 63, at 6.
119 See Woods, supranote 6, at 436.
120 Id.
121 The typical percentage gained by the law firms under a contingency-fee arrangement in the
'15

116

United States is 30 percent of the final damages awarded.
122 See Woods, supra note 6, at 463.
123 While the standard contingency fee arrangement in the United States calls for approximately one
third of the plaintiffs award to be turned over to his/her attorney, this amount does not include other
expenses that may be deducted by the attorney as long as they are reasonable.
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in addition to, the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Under the
U.S. system however, a defendant in such an action does not receive a similar
benefit. 124
Unlike the contingency system practiced in the U.S., "every European
legal system employs a fee-shifting standard of some type that requires the
losing party to pay the prevailing party's legal fees"' 125 This standard heavily
discourages a plaintiff from bringing any cause of action, let alone a
competition violation claim against a powerful entity who is likely to rack up a
great deal of legal fees, unless he/she is likely to succeed. 126 Without the
abolition of this fee-shifting standard and the incorporation of a contingency-fee
system it may be that the private right of action in the EU will not flourish with
these monetary obstacles remaining lingering overhead.
C. Damages
Under Section 15 of the Clayton Act an individual seeking a private
right of action in the U.S. is permitted to sue for and recover "threefold the
damages by him sustained.' ' 127 This concept is referred to as treble damages
and it was initiated not only to punish the violating party for their current
violation of the antitrust
laws, but also to deter them from engaging in
12 8
violations in the future.
While at first glance this notion of triple the injury sustained may look
like a windfall for the plaintiff, it has been argued that the amounts awarded are
not actually trebled but rather are closer to the actual amount of injury
sustained. 29 The root of this notion is that the lack of "prejudgment interest"
awarded in the U.S. causes the plaintiff's award to be closer to actual damages
or even less than the actual damages sustained after their transaction costs and
attorney's fees have been paid. Though the Clayton Act does state that a court
presiding over an antitrust claim may award interest on actual damages
calculated from the date of service of such person's claim to the date of
judgment, or for a period less than that,' 30 courts in the U.S. usually do not
award prejudgment interest unless a litigant has acted in bad faith to

124 See
125 See
126

Clayton Act, supra note 12.
Beisner, supra note 63, at 14.

id.

27 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
128 See
129 See

Woods, supra note 6.
Jones, supra note 3.

130 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
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31

deliberately delay the proceedings.'
In addition to treble damages, it has been argued that another reason
why damages awarded in the U.S. are often quite large is because juries, rather
than judges are usually the parties who award such damages.132 Recently, there
have been a number of studies that have concluded that juries are more likely to
award greater damages than judges.' 33 As a result of likely high damage
awards, in addition to the defendant's increased liability as a result of joint and
several liability of co-defendants, a U.S. defendant in such an action is likely to
choose to settle the claim. 134 The increased likelihood of settlement proves to
be an additional incentive for plaintiffs and plaintiffs' firms in the U.S. to
initiate antirust lawsuits
as it increases their chances of coming away with some
35
form of redress. 1
As stated previously, there is no explicit grant of a private right of
action to the citizens of the EU in Articles 81 and 82 and, as such, discussion 1of
36
the types of damages one may be awarded in such an action is absent.
Though Courage v. Crehan stated that damages should be awarded to support
the practical effect of the competition law, this case did not dictate just what
process should be used to reach a suitable damage award. 37 And while national
courts now have the power to award damages to a plaintiff seeking an antitrust
action under the community laws because of Regulation 1/2003, these awards
do not prove to be as large as those in the U.S. For the most part the national
courts follow the process of damage calculation that is used in their normal civil
proceedings 3 8 where a claimant's damages are "limited to restitution; treble,
exemplary or punitive damages are generally not available."' 39 "In European
case law it does not seem that the courts of any jurisdiction have developed a
coherent approach to the subject, let alone a standardized approach across the
131 See Woods, supranote 6.

132See Beisner, supra note 63, at 18.
133 Id.

134Id. at 24. ("Cases that, based on the compensatory damages at stake, would have been relatively
minor litigation are transformed by the potential of punitive damages into litigation that poses a
threat to the defendants' fiscal health").
135 id.
136See Woods, supra note 6, at 450.
137Courage v. Crehan, C-453/99, [2001] ECR 1-6297, available at http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgibin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit-Rechercher&alldocs=alldocs&docj=docj&docop=docop&door=doc
or&docjo=docjo&numaff-C453/99&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100 (last visited, April 16,
2006).
138Id. "In some jurisdictions these methods appear capable of generating delays that are aggravated
by the complex nature of such calculations in competition cases".
139See McDavid, supra note 7.
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different jurisdictions., 140 Again because each Member State has its own
procedural law, the differences that vary from one to another certainly do not
aide in providing for a "level playing field.. .for bringing actions for breach of
Community competition law before the national courts." 141
D. Discovery
Yet another obstacle facing a potential claimant in an antitrust action is
access to the requisite evidence to prove his/her case. In the U.S., those seeking
a private cause of action are fortunate because of the broad discovery permitted
under the law. 14 2 Plaintiffs' firms are much more likely to go forward with
bringing an action because of the security of knowing they have such enormous
power when it comes to what they may request the defendant to produce. 143 A
plaintiffs counsel may even proceed with initiating an action despite lack of
knowledge of the details of the case based on his or her confidence in their
ability to garner sufficient evidence from the defendant. 144 Along with the
grand requests that a plaintiff may make to a defendant may come exorbitant
production costs.145 The ability of a plaintiff to cause a defendant to incur large
discovery costs adds to the pressure put on a defendant to agree to a settlement
early on in the proceedings despite the likelihood that the plaintiff's claims may
be without merit.1 46 In addition to their power to persuade plaintiffs to bring an
action, the U.S. discovery rules also persuade defendants to comply with such
of five years
demands because they carry a threat of a maximum jail sentence
147
for the destruction or failure to produce relevant documents.
Similar to the law regarding damages in the EU, there is no discussion
of the rules governing discovery for a private right of action with regard to
antitrust claims. Because private rights of action are dealt with in the national
courts rather than in the EJC again the possibility for inconsistencies within the
system are great. 148 While each national court does have certain rules

141

See, Woods, supra note 6, at 456.
See Woods, supra note 6, at 456.

142

Id. at 438.

143

See Beisner, supra note 63, at 16.

140

w Id.
145 Id. Stating that costs to a defendant to comply with discovery requests may reach sums "running
in the tens of millions of dollars".
146id.
147

FED. R.CIV. P. 37.

148

Id. "To the extent that there are no procedural rules at the European level - and as a matter of

EC law procedural rules are limited in scope for the moment - the national courts operate in the
context of their national procedural rules".
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governing discovery, the depth of permissible discovery does not reach that
which is permitted in the courts of the U.S., and therefore, plaintiffs will be less
likely to initiate a suit without knowing exactly what violation the defendant
committed or how he or she will go about proving it in a court of law. 149
E. Standing and Exclusion of the Indirect Purchaser
In order to bring a private right of action in the U.S. the claimant must
have "standing" to bring suit. "The gist of standing is whether there is a
justiciable controversy being litigated among adverse parties with substantial
interest affected so as to bring forth a clear articulation of the issues before the
court. ' "5 ° The Supreme Court has held, in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, that
"indirect purchasers do not have standing to sue for violations of the antitrust
laws under section 4 of the Clayton Act." 15' In that case the defendants, a
number of concrete manufacturers being sued for their collusive practices, had
sold their product to contractors who then submitted bids to general contractors,
who in turn submitted bids to the plaintiffs, the indirect purchasers. 152 Had the
contractors themselves sued the concrete manufacturers, then they would have
been able to recover damages for the inflated costs, despite the defendant's
claim that the contractors suffered no injury because they "passed on" such
costs to their customers, the general contractors. 53 This is the case because the
Supreme Court, in Hanover Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., rejected
the "passing on" defense to a suit initiated by a direct purchaser.' 54 However in
Illinois Brick, the defendant was permitted to use the "passing on" defense
because it was being sued by the customers of the contractors, the "indirect
purchasers". 55 In allowing this defense, the Supreme Court reasoned that if you
allow the use of the defense in this situation, then you would also have to allow
its use in a case where the plaintiff is a direct purchaser, 56 however there would

149 See

Beisner, supra note 63, at 17. (Stating that "the scope of available discovery in European

courts is usually circumscribed, and a European plaintiff is often unable to obtain discovery from a
defendant unless he or she can identify the documents he or she seeks with substantial specificity").
's Street v. Smart Corp., S.E.2d 695, 698 (quoting Texfi Industries v. City of Fayetteville, 261
S.E.2d 21, 23 (N.C. 1980), affid, 269 S.E.2d 142 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980)).
151Crouch v. Crompton Corp., No. 02 CVS 4375. 2004 WL 2414027, at *5 (N.C. Super. Oct. 28,
2004).
152id.
153 Id.

Id.;
see also Hanover Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
155Id.
156 Id. (Stating that "the predicate of the Illinois Brick suit was the passing on of all or part of the
15

overcharge by the direct purchaser, without passing on, there could be no injury to the indirect
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be a great problem of multiple liability if this were the case.157 In reaction to this
problem, the court found that the only ways to avoid creating multiple liability
would be to "(1) allow indirect purchasers to sue but overrule Hanover Shoe or
58
(2) retain Hanover Shoe and preclude indirect purchasers from suing."'
Eventually the court found that "the direct purchaser suit is on balance a more
effective instrument for enforcement of the antitrust rule[s]... than the indirect
purchaser suit," 159 and so it chose60to exclude indirect purchasers from bringing
private antitrust damage actions. 1
Some view this indirect purchaser exclusion to be destructive of the
"fundamental character of the private antitrust action" and against Congress'
intent in providing for the private right of action.' 61 Those who take this view
believe that to allow the direct purchaser to recover while denying the indirect
purchaser the right to recover is inadequate because it allows a party who may
not have actually been injured to collect, while leaving those actually injured
without a remedy.1 62 This notion is dismissed however, by the concept that
"even if indirect purchasers were given the nominal right to sue, they would
often fail to receive significant compensation" because of the fact that "in a
class action163, much of even the compensatory portion of the judgment may
end up in the pockets of lawyers or in states' treasuries. ,,164 Until a new system
is developed under which the windfall to the direct purchasers could be
eliminated while the recovery of indirect purchasers reaches sufficient
compensatory amounts, it is in the best interest of U.S. antitrust enforcement to
allow the exclusion of indirect purchaser suits to continue. 65
The decision by the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick excluded indirect
purchasers from suing. 166 Some states alleviated the problems created by
indirect purchasers either through the implementation of Illinois Brick repealer
statutes or by interpreting their existing statutes to permit indirect purchaser
67
standing based on language difference between the state and federal statutes.

purchaser").
157 Id.
518

Id.

"9 Id.

at 6.

160 Id.
161

id.

162

Id.

163 (Indirect

purchasers are more likely to come together in a class action because their injury taken

alone may not be great enough to assert a cause of action).
164 id.
165 Id.
166 See Crouch
167

v. Crompton, supra note 151, at 5.

Id.
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168
Repealer statutes were then challenged in California v. ARC America Corp.
In this case the Supreme Court held that states were permitted to allow indirect
purchasers to recover damages under state antitrust laws, even though "(1) the
result may and almost assuredly will
be a double recovery and (2) a preferable
169
deterrent exists under federal law."'

While the Supreme Court had made its decision with regard to the
standing of indirect purchasers in price fixing cases, it "specifically noted that
its decision was not directed to standing" in general. 170 After analyzing
Congress' intent with regard to section 4 of the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court
concluded that "Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy
in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust
violation."' 7'T The United States Supreme Court responded and set forth
minimum requirements in order for an individual to have standing to bring an
action. These requirements however, do not take the form of a "single bright
line test", 1 72 rather they require judges to assess the plaintiffs harm, the
supposed violation by the defendant, and the causal relationship between the
two based on a series of factors: (1) whether the plaintiff is a consumer or
competitor in the allegedly restrained market, (2) whether the injury alleged is
direct and a first hand product of the restraint alleged, (3) whether there exist
more directly injured parties with motivation to sue, (4) whether the damage
claims are speculative and (5)whether the claims (a) risk duplicative
recovery
73
and (b) would require a complex apportionment of damages. 1
In some member states of the EU, such as Germany and Italy, the laws
regarding standing are much narrower in that they call for the injured party 1to
74
be directly targeted by an antitrust violator in order to seek compensation.
While in other European jurisdictions, such as England, an individual may have
standing where (1) a violator did not have any knowledge of his violation but
merely engaged in it by charging a price created under an illegal cartel scheme
by its parent corporation,' 7 5 and (2) there was no actual purchase by the plaintiff
from this violator. 176 Such differences in standing requirements are liable to

168 California

v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).

169 See Crouch, supra note 151, at 8.
170 Id.
171

Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 (1972).

172

Id.

173 Associated

Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Counsel of Carpenters, 459

U.S. 519 (1983).
174 See Woods, supra note 6, at 441.
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the member states; a trait quite uncharacteristic
breed "forum shopping" among
177
of an efficient legal arena.
The procedural rules of some Member States in the EU, such as Italy,
Sweden and France, call for a plaintiff to meet a strict causation requirement
with regard to the defendant's actions and the injury sustained in a competition
law case. 178 For an indirect purchaser, meeting this requirement is likely to be
unattainable, and so it seems that the "procedural laws of these member states
could be said to resemble the U.S. indirect purchaser rule," in that they both
prevent consumers from seeking a remedy for an injury caused by an antitrust
violator. 179
Again, as a result of the lack of the private right of action under the EU
competition law, there is a lack of discussion of the "passing on" defense which
has created such debate in the U.S. Supreme Court and within the states
themselves. 180 "There does not appear to be any case law directly on point from
any jurisdiction in relation to actions for breach of EC competition laws,"
however the issue has been considered in some national courts, such as Italy,
where the court declined to award damages to a plaintiff because the court
found that the plaintiff had "passed on" the effects of the defendant's violation
to its customers.' 8' Therefore, it seems that under at least one member states'
law, defendants in suits by direct purchasers are permitted to utilize the "passing
on" defense, though82 it remains unclear how other national courts would
confront the matter. 1
GREEN PAPER: PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR
VIOLATIONS OF EU ANTITRUST LAWS
83
On December 19, 2005 the Commission presented a Green Paper
focusing on damages actions for the breach of the EU antitrust rules, or in other
words private rights of action.' 84 The purpose of the Green Paper and its
attached Commission Staff Working Paper (the "Working Paper") 185 is to

177

Id.

178

Id.

179

Id. at 449.

180Id.
181 Id. at 459.
182 Id. at 458.
183See European Union Documents: Documents of Individual Institution, available at
http://europa.eu.int/documents/comm/index.en.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
184 See Green Paper, supra note 4.
185Commission Staff Working Paper:Annex to the Green Paper.Damages Actions for Breach of
the EC Antitrust Rules, Dec. 19, 2005, availableat
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"identify the main obstacles to a more efficient system of damages claims and
to set out different options for further reflection and possible action to improve
damages actions.' 86 Among other things,187 the Green Paper and the Working
Paper discuss the obstacles facing an efficient system for a private right of
action with regard to such areas as discovery, damages, costs of actions,
collective actions, and indirect purchaser standing.!88 The Commission hopes
that by putting forth these documents they will encourage "interested parties to
comment on the issues discussed and on the options formulated with regard to
these issues."' 89 Hopefully, with these comments the Commission will be aided
in its efforts to establish an efficient and effective system for private antitrust
damages claims. 190
A. Green Paper: Discovery
As was previously mentioned, because the depth of permissible
discovery not only varies from Member State to Member State, but also on the
whole is much less than that which is provided for under the U.S. system, it is
not as simple for a potential claimant in the EU to initiate private antitrust
actions, as well as, garner enough information to be able to prove his/her case,
as it is for a claimant in the U.S.' 9' In its Green Paper the Commission asks
"whether there should be special rules on disclosure of documentary evidence in
192
civil proceedings for damages under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty?"'
The Green Paper proposes that once a claimant has "set out in detail
the relevant facts of the case and has presented reasonably available evidence in
support of its allegations (fact pleading)," then that party would be able to go
forward with the disclosure process' 9 3 The Green Paper list three possible
options for disclosure once the fact pleading has been set forth. 94 Under
"Option 1", disclosure would be court ordered and limited to relevant and

http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions-for-damages/sp-en.pdf (last visited
Feb. 23, 2006).
186 See Green Paper, supra note 4.
187 Id. (Other aspects commented on consist of jurisdiction, the fault requirement, the introduction
of experts, statute of limitation, etc.)
188 Id.
189 Id. at 5.
19o Id.

191 See Beisner, supra note 63, at 16-17.
192

Commission Green Paper, supra note 4, at 5.

193 id.
194 Id.
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reasonably identified individual documents. 95 Under "Option 2", mandatory
disclosure of classes of documents between the parties would be ordered by the
court, and under "Option 3" "there would be an obligation on each party to
a list of relevant documents in its
provide the other parties to the litigation with
' 96
them."'
to
accessible
are
which
possession,
In requiring the claimant to set forth a fact pleading rather than a notice
197
pleading like that in the U.S. the proposed EU discovery system will not
allow a potential claimant to set forth a claim without knowing the substance of
his/her claim. This is important because it will deter potential claimants from
overloading the courts with unmeritorious claims.' 98 With such a burden on the
claimant to begin with, adopting Option 3 would persuade claimants to bring an
action because it would allow the claimants to choose from a complete list of
relevant documents which they may not have had knowledge of when initiating
the case. 199

B. Green Paper: Damages
The Green Paper sets forth 4 possible ways in which damages could be
defined.2 °° Under "Option 14" damages would be awarded "with reference to
the loss suffered by the claimant as a result of the infringing behavior of the
defendant (compensatory damages).",20 1 "Option 15" calls for damages to
include the recovery of illegal gain, while "Option 16" calls for double
damages.20 2 And finally,
"Option 17" discusses the possibility of awarding
203
prejudgment interest.
As discussed previously, in the U.S. a claimant may sue for and
recover treble damages for violations of the antitrust law. 204 The Commission

195 Id.
M9

id.

197See Commission Staff Working Paper, supra note 185. ("Under notice pleading it is not

necessary to make a prima facie case for a party to require discovery of evidence by another party).
'98 Notion that because it is so easy to initiate a case in the U.S. a claimant can start discovery
proceedings without actually knowing the complete substance or facts regarding his her claim, or
whether such claim is legitimate or not. In doing so that claimant could potentially cost the
defendant large sums in production costs, thereby putting pressure on such defendant to settle a
claim that may not have merit, just to avoid the cost.
'99 See Commission Green Paper, supra note 4, at 5.
0 id. at 7.
201 id.
202 id.
203 id.
204

15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
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recognizes that "pure compensation of the loss does not always constitute a
sufficient incentive for antitrust claimants to bring a case before the court,"
however, it does not seem that they are prepared to initiate treble damages as it
does not appear in the list of possible options. 20 5 That which would be most
persuasive in causing an individual to seek out a claim, while at the same time
creating a deterrent to future violations, would be to allow potential claimants to
collect double their damages calculated to include prejudgment interest. Unlike
the U.S. system a claimant in the E.U. probably would not have to make a claim
for attorneys' fees as most of Europe follows a system by which the losing party
pays the winning party's fees.206
C. Green Paper: Costs of Actions
Availability of litigation capital is an essential factor when deciding
whether or not to bring a claim for damages, especially when the claimant is in
a legal system which calls for them to pay the defendant's costs in the event that
they loose their claim.20 7 Under "Option 27" the Green Paper proposes
"establish[ing] a rule that unsuccessful claimants will have to pay costs only if
they act in a manifestly unreasonable manner by bringing the case." By
adopting this proposal the Commission will alleviate a great burden for
claimants who wish to bring an antitrust claim.
The Green Paper, does however, fail to discuss a proposal for adopting
a contingency fee type system, like that of the U.S., whereby claimants will not
20 8
be discouraged from pursuing an action because of lack of litigation capital.
Should the Commission provide for such a system, the amount of private
actions would certainly increase, and in turn enforcement of the antitrust laws
would increase as well.
D. Green Paper: Collective Actions
The Commission realizes that it is "unlikely for practical reason, if not
impossible, that consumers and purchasers with small claims will bring an
action for damages for breach of antitrust law. 2 ° 9 In addition to providing a
way for individuals to bring their small claims against antitrust violators,
collective actions, or class actions as they are termed in the U.S., would also
See Commission Staff Working Paper, supra note 185, at 34.
See Beisner, supra note 63, at 14.
207 Id. at 61.
208 See Commission Green Paper, supra note 4, at 7.

205
206

209 Id. at
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create more efficiency in the private antitrust enforcement arena because they
would allow a large number of claims to be grouped together into one claim
thereby saving valuable time and money.210 The Green Paper proposes under
"Option 25" to create a system that would allow consumer associations to bring
actions on behalf of a group of injured parties whereby damages would be
awarded such that the illegal gain of the defendant would be awarded to the
consumer organization, while each injured party would recover the amount of
individual damage suffered.21' Initiating collective actions of this type would
not only increase the incentive for individuals with small claims to seek
damages action against antitrust violators, but it will also increase deterrence of
antitrust violation.
E. Green Paper: Indirect Purchaser Exclusion and the "Passing
On" Defense
As the Commission well recognizes, "the 'passing-on defense'
substantially increases the complexity of damages claims as the exact
distribution of damages along the supply chain could be exceedingly difficult to
prove. 212 "Option 23," set forth in the Green Paper, calls for the complete
exclusion of the passing-on defense. 213 While this would serve to bolster a great
deterrent for parties to engage in antitrust violations because of the extreme
amount of liability they would be facing, it does seem to be quite unjust.
"Option 24" on the other hand, seems to be an ideal solution to the indirect
purchaser problem, because it calls for "a two-step procedure, in which... the
infringer can be sued by any victim, and in a second step, the overcharge is
distributed between all the parties. 214 However, the problem of damage
calculation would remain and this process could cost valuable time and
money.215 If anything can be learned from the U.S. experience on the issue of
the passing-on defense, it may be that in the interest of efficient antitrust
enforcement it may be necessary to allow only direct purchasers to sue and reap
a windfall while indirect purchasers remain excluded.
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CONCLUSION
As the European Union embarks on its journey toward a system that
could efficiently provide for a guaranteed private right of action for its citizens
it has many things to consider: Whether to (1) broaden discovery to enable
claimants to easily get the information needed to prove their case; (2) provide
for greater damages to compensate injury while creating a great deterrent to
illegal antitrust actions; (3) depart from the "loser-pays" rule so that claimants
won't be discouraged from bringing legitimate actions; (4) create a collective
action system by which small claimants can bond together, and (5) block some
claimants from bringing suit in the best interest of efficient antitrust
enforcement. While it may not be ideal for the EU to adopt a system identical
to that of the U.S. private antitrust enforcement, there is certainly a great deal
that can be learned by looking at the U.S. system and how its framework works
to create an arena that fosters private rights of action. Through the use of this
example, as well as the comments that should emerge in response to the
Commission's Green Paper, the EU will soon be well on its way to establishing
a private right of action and a marked increase in its antitrust enforcement for
the benefit of competition and consumers alike.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

29

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 8

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol5/iss1/8

30

